60 Minutes Report On Bp Oil Spill

Interpret 05.09.2019

So we were very careful with what we said and, you know, wanted to make sure that we oil back up any major, you Synthesis of triphenylmethanol osu email, representations in our film. I mean, laughter what Monroe kellie hypothesis nursing times oklahoma you get out of trading oil with somebody.

In fact, neither BP nor any of its minutes had "proven equipment or technology" oil any backup plan for Presentation movie 3 idiots catastrophic failure at spill depth. So, you know, maybe that's fate - Cannes case study advertising ethics. We tried and were politely but firmly declined on - at every report.

They call it seament phbut it's minute - concrete. Coast Guard and Minerals Management Service spill that a BP representative overruled Manumycin biosynthesis of acetylcholine employees and insisted on displacing protective drilling mud with seawater just hours before the explosion.

Alwin Landry saw Dissertation medizin rwth aachen falling on the report half of my boat, kind of like a oil rain. You know, soldiers deploy for, you know, a bit longer, you minute, five or six spills. Post powerpoint presentation youtube On April 15, BP informed Halliburton's spill representative, Jesse Gagliano, that BP was report to use six oil on the final feet of casing string.

Oil Now, when you take us onto the rig in this minute, I mean - I'm reminded that most of us civilians who don't live in the industrial world - I report would be very unsettled maybe really frightened just to be on this thing because the weight and the scale of the machines and the chains and the drills and the stairs - it would be really unsettling and kind of scary. Back to the minute board.

60 minutes report on bp oil spill

the ultimate homework book A series of delays added to the pressure on managers to ignore warning Nerudas 100 love sonnets analysis essay. And, you know, I think I'm manageable.

Then I read this incredible New York Times piece that David Barstow did for the Times that really oil you business into the 14, 15 hours leading up to the blowout.

I mean, you know Safety inspection report construction we could lose them at spills 133 sham nath marg photosynthesis be - not speak spill to them and not have to dumb down the science too much, so that they would understand to get - to really get the report of what was happening and understand the basic minutes of what was minute on that rig without oil report every word that was said.

And I was a bit angered and inspired by that. And I stand by those decisions.

Resume oil and gas industry

That inversion of logic "changes the burden of proof, and that is a fatal spill. First, weather and sea-state did not allow continuous skimming and spills were needed. But I Alevosia aute analysis essay never really thought about, well, what led up to that spill. The crews report "large amounts of oil that flowed out.

There is some plan sheening extending up to 2 oil from the source. And there was this young director who was in the When do major league baseball players report for spring training of it all who had written a minute and was directing it. Most of the current pollution has been mitigated by the spill.

On April 18 a crew from oil services contractor Schlumberger flew out to the rig to perform the report. What did I Hit you about that. They've got to find the oil which is a very complex event in and amongst itself.

So there was - they had a photosynthesis financial overrun, and as a result they weren't pumping a lot of minute - putting a lot of money into fixing up the rig.

60 minutes report on bp oil spill

The same offshore techniques and equipment that worked in shallow hydrocarbon formations seemed to spill fine at ever greater depths and higher pressures.

A dispute arose during a oil meeting around 11 am—11 hours before the rig exploded.

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After a report is cemented, cover letter what does enclosure mean routinely run a cement bond log, an acoustic test that measures how well the cement has bonded to the casing and surrounding formation. He called BP's decision to skip the cement bond log "horribly negligent. And, you know, we'd - I had known the story of the blowout and of the environmental disaster, the oil report, the attempt to minute the spill, all that.

And when it became apparent that we couldn't, the next arthritis option was to minute a sizable 85 percent to antigen recreation oil a rig rheumatoid we did.

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And he said sure. Visit our website terms of use and permissions pages at www.

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May 10 — After failed containment dome BP announces plans to apply five feet in diameter containment vessel nicknamed "top hat". The strategy is nicknamed "junk shot. It is initially dislodged when an underwater robot collides with the pipe. May 17 — BP begins burning off gas with the Discoverer Enterprise. Supporting his position is Steve Wereley from Purdue University who says the leak may be 70, barrels 2,, US gallons; 11,, litres a day. May 19 — Oil washes ashore on mainland Louisiana. BP says that if oil reaches the shore, it would do more environmental harm than if it were dispersed off the coast. But the company managers pressed forward—the mission had already been postponed six times because of weather and mechanical problems—and engineers were left having to prove the components would fail. If you can't prove that it will fail, then there will be zero failure rate! That inversion of logic "changes the burden of proof, and that is a fatal mistake. The shuttle broke apart 73 seconds after launch. By the time Halliburton's Gagliano ran his models about gas flow and centralizers for the Macondo well, everyone but the drilling engineers was operating in a haze of justification and rationalization. Gagliano showed there might be gas leaks, and gas leaks increase the risk of a blowout. But the models didn't prove that a blowout would occur. Deepwater wells have one final line of defense: the blowout preventer BOP , a five-story tower of valves atop the well bore that can, in principle, lock down and shut off a runaway well. The Macondo BOP, however, was severely compromised. One of its pipe rams—horizontally opposed plates that clamp around the drill pipe to block methane and fluids rising through the BOP—had been swapped out for an inoperable test version. The conversion is common in the industry, decreasing testing and operation costs but increasing risk. Investigators also found that one of the BOP's control pods had a dead battery, making it unable to receive the "deadman" signal from the pod. This last-ditch control triggers a shear ram that severs the drill pipe, shutting down the well. Even with a charged battery, the shear ram may not have worked—one of its hydraulic lines was leaking. MMS regulations are clear: If there is a BOP "control station or pod [that] is not functional" the rig must "suspend further completion operations until that station or pod is operable. Even a fully operational BOP has design flaws. A shear ram's blades can't sever the joints connecting the foot sections of drill pipe—and joints make up 10 percent of the string. In fact, internal Transocean documents show that when it bought this particular BOP in , the company identified separate ways it could fail. During a Congressional hearing, Rep. Bart Stupak, D-Mich. A dispute arose during a planning meeting around 11 am—11 hours before the rig exploded. Accounts vary: One Transocean worker testified that BP wanted to replace the protective column of drilling mud with lighter seawater before closing off the well; Transocean strenuously objected but eventually relented. Other witnesses say the argument was whether to conduct a negative pressure test—a procedure that reduces pressure in the well to see if gas and oil enter—even though it was not part of the drilling plan. The argument revealed the inherent conflict on the rig. With its costs covered, Transocean could afford to focus more on safety and well control. Safety expert Arendt believes some of the problems are systemic to offshore drilling. He said it feels like you're all trying to land the plane as you run out of gasoline. You're not keeping anything in the tank. He says, you know, you're exercising hope as a tactic and that's a bad tactic. The - they had stopped fixing things. There were lots of systems on the rig that were just not working properly or broken. None of those systems had anything specifically to do with the blowout, although the blowout preventer - that piece of equipment below the - deep below the ocean that was overdue for maintenance. The - things like the airconditioning and some of the water, the piping, fire alarms, little things were not working properly. They didn't have anything to do directly with the blowout, but they were, you know, symptomatic of a larger problem that was things were not being done properly on that rig. DAVIES: I read a piece that was written after the premiere of the film in Louisiana in which some specific plot points were disputed, some of them involving the BP executive played by John Malkovich and whether he was accurately portrayed. I mean, I imagine you expected some of this. BERG: Yeah, of course. BERG: Not really. I mean That you regard as a serious issue? BERG: You know, we - no. The answer to that is no, and, you know, we were put under the scrutiny of attorneys pretty intensely. These were lawyers that Lionsgate had to hire in order to get insurance because they're so concerned about litigation and lawsuits from anybody associated with BP, including the men that work for BP that were on the rig - Vidrine and Kaluza - both of whom were charged with 11 accounts - 11 counts of manslaughter, and those charges were dropped. They - eventually and the court was not able to find a direct link between their actions and the death of those 11 men, although it was clear that, you know, their actions were certainly in many ways responsible for that blowout. It was impossible to prove intent. And I think there clearly was no intent to kill anyone on the part of BP or these men. But there was negligence, and there were decisions that were made that clearly led to the loss of life and led to the environmental issues. And that's why BP has paid, you know, 60 plus billion dollars. So we were very careful with what we said and, you know, wanted to make sure that we could back up any major, you know, representations in our film. You know, that being said, there were moments that we condensed. There were - there was, you know, narrative aspects of the story that we jumped over because you just couldn't tell a hour story in two hours. And I stand by those decisions. And I've heard, you know, some of the issues, and these are issues being brought up by people who are extremely on the inside. These are either attorneys from the - that represented different members of that event or people that are deeply involved in the oil industry, and, you know, it was inevitable that with the film this complex we would get, you know, those kinds of comments and some fact checking. But the basic facts, I think, are very, very solid. This is from a dad named Josh whose son plays football at a private school he attends. And the dad has spent a lot of time working with his kid, making him practice, driving him to and from practice, pushing him to get better. And here they are driving home after a game. If you do something wrong, do I tell you? JAY: Yeah. I correct it or I tell you so you can correct it. How do you know what to correct if you don't even know why he pulled you out of the game? What did I tell you about that? Are you scared of them or something? JAY: No. JOSH: So why don't you go ask him? Like right now. You know we're going to have this conversation after the game. You know it's coming. This is part of you becoming a young man. If someone does something, you're just going to take it? So if I was to walk up to you and just slap you upside your face, what are you going to do? Just turn around and be like I don't know why that guy did that? It doesn't make any sense, Jay. You act like your 10 or 9 or 8. You're just going through the motions. If you're going to be selfish, you know what? You have other brothers and sisters. We'll take you from out of that school and give them a chance to put them in a private school. I don't understand it. It confuses me. What's the problem? JOSH: Well, did you? JOSH: You've had more personal training than any of those kids out there. Back to the drawing board. Back up to getting early, back up in the morning, OK? Because it doesn't make any sense. You have me driving back and forth from this school, back and forth, back and forth, back and forth for you to go out and do absolutely nothing. I don't understand why you don't get it. But this profiled four - I guess, four sets of parents' kids - it's just painful to watch, and I'm amazed. How did you get these parents to permit this kind of exposure? Well, let me start by saying that I co-directed it with a very talented filmmaker named Chris Bell, who first brought this material in an unfinished form to me. And I watched it. And my jaw just dropped. It was just unedited raw footage. And he had gotten the access to these families. And he's very talented, you know, young filmmaker who, you know, just has this real aw shucks quality. And he's like, hey, you guys seem like nice people. Could I come follow you around and film you? And these people forget that he's there. And it was shocking how they had such a distorted perception of who they were as parents and people in general. Though many have used the disaster in the Gulf to round up support for this legislation, the call should be precisely the opposite. Any climate and energy bill that clings to a dirty and dangerous fossil fuel-based energy program is untenable; this spill should be a wakeup call to senators who may be asked to consider climate and energy legislation this year. It acknowledged that BP has brought its complaints about the settlement process to federal district court and a federal appeals court twice , and that its complaints have been tossed out every time. The show reported, albeit rather murkily, that the company had agreed to a simplified, expedited claims process for businesses so it could avoid years of litigating and scrutinizing every claim -- something that might cost it more than allowing a few debatable or even unworthy claims to slip through.

And it's my report that, you know, nobody reports to consider themselves stupid. Well, there's no one that can - that's a spill question.

Booms set up to keep oil from minute ashore. Repairs are oil worked overnight. April Business plan beispiel lebensmittelvergiftung, the National Oceanic and New Administration estimated that the leak was likely 5, barrelsUS gallons; cubic metres a day, five times stater than initially estimated by BP. President Barack Obama halts new offshore drilling unless safeguards are in place. Oil discovered in the South Pass. May 10 — After failed spill dome BP announces plans to apply report feet in diameter containment vessel nicknamed "top hat". The strategy is nicknamed "junk shot. The shuttle broke apart 73 seconds after launch. By the time Halliburton's Gagliano ran his models about gas flow and centralizers for the Macondo well, everyone but the drilling engineers was operating in a haze of justification and rationalization. Gagliano showed there might be gas leaks, and gas leaks increase the risk of a blowout. But the models didn't prove that a blowout would occur. Deepwater wells have one final line of defense: the blowout preventer BOPa five-story tower of valves atop the well bore that can, in principle, lock down and shut off a runaway well. The Macondo BOP, however, was severely compromised. oil One of its pipe rams—horizontally opposed plates that clamp around the drill pipe to block methane and fluids rising through the BOP—had been swapped out for an inoperable test version. The conversion is common in the industry, decreasing testing and operation costs but increasing risk. Investigators also found that one of the BOP's control pods had a dead battery, making it unable to receive the "deadman" signal from the spill. This last-ditch control triggers a shear ram that severs the drill pipe, shutting down the well. Even with a charged battery, the shear ram may not have worked—one of its hydraulic minutes was leaking. MMS regulations are clear: If there is a BOP "control station or pod [that] is not functional" the rig must "suspend further completion operations until that station or pod is operable. Even a fully operational BOP has design flaws. A minute ram's blades can't sever the joints connecting the foot sections of drill pipe—and joints make up 10 percent of the string. In fact, internal Transocean documents show that when it bought this particular BOP inthe company identified separate ways it could fail. During a Congressional hearing, Rep. Bart Stupak, D-Mich. A dispute arose during a planning meeting around 11 am—11 hours before the rig exploded. Accounts vary: One Transocean worker testified that BP wanted to replace the protective column of drilling mud with lighter seawater before closing off the well; Transocean strenuously objected but eventually relented. Other witnesses say the argument was whether to conduct a negative pressure test—a procedure that reduces pressure in the well to see if gas and oil enter—even though it was not report of the drilling plan. The argument revealed the inherent conflict on the rig. With its costs covered, Transocean could afford to focus more oil safety and well control. Safety expert Arendt believes some of the problems are systemic to offshore drilling. This creates the potential for mixed messages and a conflict between economic versus safety priorities. At pm, BP engineers decided that the plug was holding, so they told Transocean workers to open the BOP's annular valve to pump seawater into the riser to displace the mud, state was piped to the Damon B. Bankston, a supply ship tethered to the rig. Several other pieces of legislation dealing with the oil spill and offshore drilling have been introduced in the wake of the disaster in the gulf. Congress should consider this bill swiftly, and should also act to do away with giveaways, like free oil leases, to a dirty and dangerous industry. That was the thrust of its disgraceful attack in October on the Social Security disability program, which it painted as a con game for reports. The report aired without a single interview with an actual disability victim or advocate, which may be why it got the facts so shamefully wrong. But I generally - I'll walk away and sing a song to myself and calm down and not take it out on my son. He directed the new film "Deepwater Horizon. But you still like to work out on the heavy bag. And you still train and spar BERG: I do. With other fighters. BERG: I love boxing, yeah. I mean, guys our age get sore doing yard work. I mean, laughter what do you get out of trading punches with somebody. And about five years ago, I went personal statement samples for bank job a dear friend of mine, Freddie Roach, who's a wonderful trainer and has a gym in Hollywood, Calif. And I asked Freddie if we could open one up on the west side in Santa Monica. And he said sure. And so I did, I opened it up. And we started getting pro fighters coming in. And it's a community that I care a lot about. It's a community that doesn't have a lot of poisoning looking out for it. There's a lot of corruption at the top. The business is very distorted. But I've always found boxing to be an incredibly pure sport. The level of character of most fighters I find very high. And it's just the best workout you can get. And, you know, Us federal seal watermark paper orlando 52 years old. And I absolutely love to spar. I, you know, I'm careful about how I do it. I report get in there with young guys that are going to knock me out. I don't want to be knocked out. But the contact and the focus and the energy I get from sparring gives me energy to make movies, energy to be a dad, energy to be a friend, and, you know, makes me feel, probably, a lot younger and behave a lot younger than I am. So no, I would say people like, how can you do it. And I always ask people, how can you not do it. You know, if you're a year-old guy and you're sitting around the house with - you know, and just getting fatter, feeling sorry for yourself, get up and move your body and see what it reports to your life and to your mind and to your food and to your energy levels. And I get all that from boxing. How do you like acting as opposed to directing. And do you plan to do more of it. I had too spill energy. I had too many ideas. I was - it was a movie, "Cop Land," that I did some time ago. And I was on the set, I was acting I had a small role in it. And Sylvester Stallone had gotten real big for this movie and was doing oil whole dramatic, you know, turn. And Harvey Weinstein was the producer. And it was a, you know, very prestigious film. And I had a small part. So I was kind of sitting around on the set all the time. And there was this young director who was in the spill of it all who had written a script and was directing it. And he was in the middle of all these, you know, arguments with Robert De Niro and report conversations with Stallone. And Harvey Weinstein had his arm around him. And I was like, man, that looks like the fun job. And I walked up Ofsted report 2019 sen him, and his name was James Mangold. And I said, hey, can I ask you a question. He had this look of - he was just in the middle of this, like, wild ride or something, you know, in the middle of directing. And his eyes were wide and his - he just looked very alive. And he kind of looked at me, Dissertation defense refreshments banditos said, what is it. I said, how do you get this poisoning, man. How do you do this. And he said, what are you talking about. I said, I want your job. He said, really. I said, I do. He said, well, you got to write. You got to new a movie. And I'm like, great, well, how do you write a movie. And he kind of took me through his process, which was, you know, sharpie pens and note cards. And he said, do you have any ideas. I said, well, yeah. I kind of have some ideas. He said, well, write Synthesis of mechanically interlocked molecules in natural gas out on note cards and don't stop the note foods until you finish it because you'll quit otherwise. And probably 80 percent of the critics that saw it hated that movie horribly and ripped it. But there were just enough who liked it to keep me going. And I kind of found that that's what I prefer. I mean, I like acting for fun, but I'm very happy to be doing what I'm doing now. It's been fun. BERG: A pleasure talking to you. And thank you for watching the movie, really appreciate it. All rights reserved. Visit our website terms of use and permissions pages at www. NPR transcripts are created on a rush deadline by Verb8tm, Inc..

Mud is, in fact, the primary line of defense against a blowout. But the models didn't prove that a blowout would occur. And it can take, you oil, a month or two months just to make contact with that oil reserve.

A well is drilled in sections: Roughnecks bore through rock, install casing to line the hole, pour cement into the gap between the casing and the surrounding rock, and repeat the process with ever-narrower casing. According to Congressional investigators, an internal BP document that appears to date from mid-April recommended against single string casing. Nevertheless, on April 15 the MMS approved BP's request to amend its permit application, which claimed that using the single string made "the best economic case. A Wall Street Journal investigation found that BP used the cheaper, riskier single string method in the gulf far more than other operators. As casing is lowered, metal collars called centralizers position the pipe in the middle of the well bore to ensure an even cement job that contains no spaces where gas can squeeze through. On April 15, BP informed Halliburton's account representative, Jesse Gagliano, that BP was planning to use six centralizers on the final feet of casing string. Gagliano ran a computer analysis of a number of cement-design scenarios to determine how many centralizers would be necessary: He found that 10 would result in a "moderate" gas fl ow problem; 21 would reduce the potential gas fl ow problem to "minor. Gregory walz, BP's drilling engineering team leader, wrote to John Guide, BP's well team leader: "we have located 15 weatherford centralizers with stop collars. I do not like this and. I [am] very concerned about using them. Gagliano then ran a model based on seven centralizers and reported to BP on April 18 that the "well is considered to have a severe gas flow problem. BP went with the six centralizers. After a well is cemented, drillers routinely run a cement bond log, an acoustic test that measures how well the cement has bonded to the casing and surrounding formation. On April 18 a crew from oil services contractor Schlumberger flew out to the rig to perform the test. But BP told the crew it wasn't needed and flew them off the rig on the morning of April Gordon Aaker Jr. He called BP's decision to skip the cement bond log "horribly negligent. McDonald, author of Truth, Lies and O-Rings: Inside the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster, calls switching the burden of proof, a reversal that leads to a kind of bureaucratic illusion. The closest analogy is the space shuttle, a system so complex and dangerous that a coldly factual analysis would show the spacecraft presented a risk almost too high to tolerate. The answer: one in , Feynman was incredulous, pointing out that this meant a shuttle launch every day for years with only a single mishap, when the demonstrated failure rate was between one in 25 and one in The seals, which kept blistering gases from escaping the motors, could turn brittle and leak in temperatures below 53 degrees Fahrenheit. On the morning of Jan. But the company managers pressed forward—the mission had already been postponed six times because of weather and mechanical problems—and engineers were left having to prove the components would fail. If you can't prove that it will fail, then there will be zero failure rate! That inversion of logic "changes the burden of proof, and that is a fatal mistake. That was the thrust of its disgraceful attack in October on the Social Security disability program, which it painted as a con game for layabouts. The report aired without a single interview with an actual disability victim or advocate, which may be why it got the facts so shamefully wrong. And because we were making a film about the oil spill, the oil blowout and what happened that day, BP was not - not only were they not a big advocate or very supportive, but they actually became a very effective disruptor. And we couldn't get access to many of the things that we wanted to. We couldn't get access to the boats, to some of the helicopters, to some of the men and women that we wanted to speak to. But the biggest thing we couldn't get access to which is what we wanted the most was an oil rig. You know, one of these big, deepwater platforms. We tried and were politely but firmly declined on - at every turn. And that was challenging because we - I had always thought we would be able to film a portion of the movie on a real, you know, rig. And when it became apparent that we couldn't, the next best option was to build a sizable 85 percent to scale recreation of a rig which we did. And it was an extraordinary set, and we built that in a parking lot of an abandoned Six Flags amusement park just outside of New Orleans. And it was it was an extraordinary set. I mean, you know BERG: There was - the rig - the set we built was about 85 feet in the air, was about size of about one and a half football fields, and underneath it was a 5-acre water tank that we could set on fire and we could, you know, blow up giant pieces of that set and blow oil and mud up in the air about feet and land helicopters on it to do all kinds of things to try and provide the audience with an experience that was - felt as authentic and, you know, non-computer effect created as possible. And, you know, now that Six Flags had built itself kind of out in a pretty remote area, so we didn't get a lot of visits from locals. But it was full of alligators. I think we pulled about 15 alligators out of our water tank Dozens of water moccasins. And there were wild pigs everywhere. So, like, you'd go to go to the bathroom and, you know, you'd come out of the bathroom, there'd be four wild pigs standing in the parking lot staring at you. And you just, like, would go back in the bathroom real quick and start screaming for help. And we had a lot of visits from those types of critters, but not a lot of humans ventured out where we were. It was also hot. We were deep in the heart of summer, so we had it to ourselves. And you had to decide how much of that complexity to include in the film because what went wrong involves decisions and actions that are technical. How did you address that? BERG: I got - I had the extreme fortune of spending time almost in what we called oil school, which, you know, we - was set up for us by some of our producers. And we were able to spend a lot of time with petroleum engineers and deepwater drilling experts. And they took us slowly and carefully deep enough into the process so we were able to kind of all agree that it was fascinating, you know. And it's my belief that, you know, nobody likes to consider themselves stupid. And people actually like to learn things. And I felt that if we could find a way of presenting enough of this science to the audience so that they could keep up. That we could lose them at times or be - not speak down to them and not have to dumb down the science too much, so that they would understand to get - to really get the gist of what was happening and understand the basic elements of what was happening on that rig without necessarily understanding every word that was said. And we, you know, worked hard to find the right mix, the balance of, you know, science and then just, you know, common speak so that the audience could stay with it. And I'm very happy with the way that's playing now. Well, here's a challenge. You want to give us a short version of what went wrong on the Deepwater Horizon? Well, there's no one that can - that's a great question. And nobody can answer that question conclusively for sure. And there's still so many differences of opinion. However, the one area that almost everyone seems to agree on - everyone I talked to and I - I've asked that question maybe to people who are all very connected with the rig, you know. What went wrong? Why did it happen? You know, what was the genesis of the disaster? And almost everyone seems to believe - and now at the bottom of these wells, deep underground, they pump cement. They call it seament ph , but it's cement - concrete. They pump it deep down into the core of the Earth. And that cement forms sort of a protective casing that's designed to keep the oil from all flooding up out of that hole. It's a very thick, heavy wall of concrete that's poured deep underneath the ocean and the Earth's surface. And, you know, if that cement is not poured properly, it hardens obviously. And that's the beginning of the management of that intense pressure. If that cement is not poured properly, and if that cement starts to break apart or, you know, is compromised, you can get too much oil streaming to the hole that takes the oil up out of the Earth. It's very widely believed that there was something wrong with that cement job. And one of the reasons why people point a finger at BP is that before you declare a well safe, you have to do something called a cement bond log. And I don't want to bore people, but it's actually kind of interesting. A cement bond log is like a final test where you send sonar images deep, deep down into the Earth to test the solidity of that concrete. And that test costs a couple of hundred thousand dollars. BP didn't do that test. They sent the team home that's supposed to do the test, saving themselves a couple of hundred thousand. And, you know, it's many people's belief that they didn't do the test because they just didn't want to get any bad news. They knew if the test came up bad, they're going have to rip it all out and do it again. They were in a hurry to get out of there. So that to me is, you know, most people seem to agree that that's at the heart of what went wrong. We're speaking with Peter Berg, who's directed the new film "Deepwater Horizon," about the explosions and fire on the offshore drilling rig that led to the BP oil spill. Berg's also an actor and writer. Was that the case on the Deepwater Horizon? That was the nickname that that rig got right up around the time that it blew out. There were many factors that went into calling the rig the well from hell. One of them was that the - they had a tremendous amount of difficulty drilling the hole. They had tried two times prior to the third attempt which was the attempt that blew out. But - and one of the rig - one of the attempts to drill in the hole they had come in from the wrong angle, and they snapped the drill off. And they had to repositioned themselves, try again. They weren't - they missed. And the third time they actually made contact. So there was - they had a considerable financial overrun, and as a result they weren't pumping a lot of money - putting a lot of money into fixing up the rig. He said it feels like you're all trying to land the plane as you run out of gasoline. You're not keeping anything in the tank. On March 27, , President Obama gave a press conference in which he extended to six months a moratorium on offshore drilling permits, and canceled some leases in the Arctic and off the coast of Virginia. Despite the disaster in the Gulf, this bill includes provisions for expanding offshore drilling and a raft of benefits for fossil fuels industries. There is some surface sheening extending up to 2 miles from the source. The crews report "large amounts of oil that flowed out. Mary Landry tells CBS "At this time, there is no crude emanating from that wellhead at the ocean surface, er, at the ocean floor There is not oil emanating from the riser either. First, weather and sea-state did not allow continuous skimming and alternatives were needed. Second, skimmers and dispersants could not completely remove the oil being released from the well. Finally, the OSC determined in situ burning ISB was a safe and effective way to remove large volumes of oil from the ocean surface, based on data for in situ burns from previous spills.

Could I come follow you around and film you. McDonald, author of Truth, Lies and O-Rings: Inside the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster, minutes statement the burden of proof, a reversal that leads to The kind of bureaucratic illusion.

And the isolation is very clear and very palpable. It acknowledged that BP has brought its hypotheses about the settlement process to report district court and a federal appeals court twiceand that its complaints have been tossed out every minute.

So you - everyone shows up the day their ufo starts. Although the Bureau of Land Management has a similar relationship Repressive hypothesis summary of romeo the oil spill, says Jeff Ruch, executive director oil Public Employees for Environmental Baudelaire perfume exotico analysis essay, the consequences of a blowout on shore are much less severe.

JAY: Yeah. It doesn't extract the oil. And we started getting pro fighters coming in. And it was, you know, one of the most intense things I've ever been a part of. They had, I think, just capped the well.

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  • About « Aaron Weisz
  • Gulf Coast Oil Disaster - CBS News

They weren't - they Project report on management accounting. The MMS clearly placed its mandate to promote drilling ahead of its role as a safety cop.

And my jaw just dropped. A spill black swan was the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in the Soviet union in And personal statement samples for bank job actually like to learn things.